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The Chilean government's quick, aggressive response to the
banking crisis of 1981-83  involved an imaginative compromise
between letting Chile's banks go bankrupt, or bailing them out.
That  compromise,  and comprehensive long-term measures,
have brought a quick recovery.
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The banking crisis in Chile in 1981-83 was  (mainly through the central bank's purchase of
widespread - representing about 60 percent of  nonperfonning loans, with shareholders obli-
the banking system's total portfolio.  gated to repurchase those loans from future
profits).
The crisis arose because of macroeconomic
problems - which weakened borrowers'  The government also strengthened banking
capacity to repay loans - and was exacerbated  supervision by improving loan portfolio analysis
by unsound financial practices.  and increasing the transparency of financial
transactions.
The govemment was faced with two ex-
treme solutions: to let insolvent banks go  The decision to recognize and allocate losses
bankrupt, or to bail them out, absorbing their  quickly, and to implement comprehensive mcas-
losses.  It chose an intermediate solution. The  ures to resolve the banking crisis, were the key
government and shareholders took over losses.  to Chile's success in surviving the crisis.  Pad
Some institutions were liquidated, and others  allocation of losses been delayed, or solutions
were rescued and rehabilitated, depending on  partial, losses would probably have increased
their level of solvency.  With few exceptions,  and the system wou;d not have recovered so rap-
depositors and foreign creditors took no losses.  idly.
The government used two types of mecha-  Interest rates on loans, which reached almost
nism to rehabilitate the banking system.  One  40 percent a year in real terms in 1981-82,
type was aimed at improving borrowers' capac-  declined to 7.7 percent by 1987. Retums on
ity to repay loans to the banks (mainly across-  equity, negative in 1982, reached a healthy 13.7
the-bcard debt rescheduling and coverage for  percent in 1987.  Chile's M2/GDP ratio is
exchange rate losses).  The other was aimed at  recovering.
rebuilding the banking system's capital base
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I.  S  UARY
1.  This paper describes the different mechanisms used in Chile
to handle the banking crisis of 1981-83.  First, it gives some
background on the origins of the crisis; second, ic states its
magnitude and the options considered to handle it; third, it
describes the mechanisms implemented  within the option that was
chosen; and, finally, it provides an analysis of the results
under both macroeconomic and financial sector perspectives.
2.  The Chilean hanking crisis is a case of widespread crisis,
aggressively handled, having positive results.  Problem banks
that were either intervened or liquidated by the Government
between 1981 ind 1983 represented about 60 percent of the
system's total loan portfolio.  Spreads were increased by banking
institutions to compensate portfolio losses associated with non-
performing loans. These spreads steadily decreased from 11.2
percent in 1983 to 5.9 percent in 1987.  Similarly, interest
rates on loans, which reached almost 40 percent a year in real
terms during 1981/82, declined to 7.7 percent in 1987.  Return on
equity, which was negative in 1982, reached a healthy 13.7
percent in 1987.  Moreover, M2/GDP has been gradually recovering.
3.  Although the Government has absorbed an important part of
the costs of the banking crisis, the above results were achieved
within a sound and increasingly stable macroeconomic environment.
Inflation, which in 1983 reached 23.1 percent, dropped to 19.9
percent in 1987, and is expected to reach 12.7 percent in 1988.
Real GDP, which in 1982 fell 14.1 percent, grew steadily at an
average rate of 5 percent a year during 1984-87, with a much
higher figure expected for 1988.  Unemployment, which in 1982
peaked at i9.6 percent, declined to 9.6 percent in 1987, with an
expected rate of 8 percent by the end of 1988.  Moreover, the
country is current in the service of its external debt which has
a size close to its GDP.
4.  The origins of the banking crisis are related, to a large
extent, to the severe macroeconomic problems experienced by the
country, and Latin America, especially from the end of 1981
through 1982.  Macroeconomic problems substantially weakened the
repayment capacity of Large segments of Chilean borrowers.
Borrowers were faced, in a short period of time, with an abrupt
'Senior  Advisor,  Financial  Sector,  LATTF,  World  Bank.
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fall in domestic sales because of recession, an important change
in relative prices, a sharp increase in interest rates, a
substantial increase in the peso equivalent level of foreign
currency-denominated debts, and with sudden termination of
external credit.  These problems weakened the repayment capacity
of Chilean borrowers and forced banking institutions to absorb
important losses, which in most cases wiped out their equity
capital.
5.  The negative impact of macroeconomic problems was in several
cases aggravated by a surge of unsound financial practices.
These unsound practices resulted from a regulatory environment
where supervision and control did not keep pace; until very late,
with other reforms in the economy.  Of particular importance were
loose lending practices..  especially loan concentration in
affiliated and usually highly leveraged industrial/financial
conglomerates.
6.  In the face of the widespread banking crisis the Government
was faced with two extreme solutions:  to let insolvent
institutions go bankrupt or to bail out these institutions by
absorbing their losses.  The first solution would have created no
direct costs for the Government, although it would have caused a
chain of bankruptcies for two thirds of the banking system and
large segments of borrowers.  The second solution would have
transferred costs to the Government and would have represented a
complete departure from Chile's market-oriented economic policy.
In the end, an intermediate solution was chosen.  Losses were
taken primarily by the Government and by shareholders.  Moreover,
some institutions were liquidated and others rescued and
rehabilitated according to their degree of insolvency.  With few
exceptions, depositors and foreign creditors took no losses.
7.  The mechanisms used by the Government to rehabilitate the
banking system can be grouped into two categories:  those
directed at improving borrowers' repayment capacity, mainly
across-the-board debt reschedulings and coverage against exchange
rate losses; and those aimed at rebuilding the banking system's
capital base, mainly the purchase of non-performing loans by the
Central Bank (with an obligation for shareholders to repurchase
these loans from future profits) and the direct recapitalization
and subsequent sale to small investors of large intervened banks.
In addition, the Chilean Government completely changed the focus
of banking supervision by starting to concentrate on loan
portfolio analysis, assessing the overall financial condition of
each banking institution, and increasing transparency.
8.  The decision to recognize and allocate the losses resulting
from the banking crisis in a short period of time, together with
the decision to implement comprehensive measures for its
solution, has been key to the success of the Chilean experience.- 3 -
If the allocation of losses had been delayed or the implemented
solutions had been partial, rapid recovery of the banking system
would not have been possible.  Similarly, losses would most
likely have increased.
II.  THE CRISIS AND ITS ORIGINS
2.1  Liberalization and Growth
9.  After Chile's economic situation had run out  of control--
annualized inflation above 1,000 percent, black market exchange
rate over ten times the official rate, negative net international
reserves, and fiscal deficit close to 25 percent of GDP--the
Government that took office in 1973 decided upon a complete
change in economic policy.  Several measures were taken to open
the economy to foreign competition and to increase the role of
the market in resource allocation.  Accordingly, import duties
were gradually reduced and other barriers to imports dismantled;
the domestic currency was strongly devalued; and price controls
were eliminated.  Fiscal deficits were brought under control as
well.
10.  Following the 1974/75 efforts to stabilize the economy and
the development of a strong set of economic incentives, economic
activity started a steady growth.  Real GDP grew at an average
rate of 7.2 percent a year between 1976 and 1981.  Inflation
declined, reaching its lowest level of 9.5 percent in 1981.
Unemployment, after increasing as a consequence of the structural
change experienced by the economy, started to decline in 1979,
reaching its lowest pre-crisis level of 10.4 percent in 1980
(Table  1).
11.  Starting in 1973 and consistent with the Government's
overall economic policy, several measures were implemented to
liberalize and increase the banking sector's efficiency.
Controls on interest rates, which had been negative in real terms
in various periods, were eliminated.  Similarly, controls on the
growth and allocation of credit were discontinued.  Minimum
reserve requirements were gradually lowered to 10 percent for
demand deposits and 4 percent for time deposits.  Barriers to
entry into the market were softened and new charters were given
to both domestic and foreign banks, the latter competing on the
same basis as that of the former.  Moreover, all banks which had
been nationalized by the previous Government were sold back to
the private sector on the basis of public biddings.  As a result,
Banco del Estado remained the only publicly owned commercial ar.d
development banking institution.  In addition, access to foreign-4-
Table  1  Selected  macroeconomic  indicators  (1974-83)
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
Real GDP growth  rate  (%)  5.7  -12.9  3.5  9.9  8.2  8.3  7.8  5.5  -14.1  -0.7
Real  effective  exchange
rate  (1980 = l00)*  83.6  113.4  103.0  101.7  115.4  115.2  100.0  86.0  98.2  117.5
Terms  of trade
(1980 =  100)a  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  99.4  100.0  84.3  80.4  85.8
Current  account/GDP  (%)  -4.3  -11.8  2.0  -5.4  -7.6  -6.0  -7.1  -18.9  -14.7  -7.1
Fiscal  deficit  (-)  or
surplus/GDPb  -5.3  0.1  1.4  -1.1  -0.1  4.8  5.4  2.6  -1.0  -2.6
M2/GDP  (%)c  9.3  10.0  10.5  11.8  14.2  14.9  19.3  23.7  25.7  19.3
Inflation  (CPI) (%)  375.9  340.7  174.3  63.5  30.3  38.9  31.2  9.5  20.7  23.1
Unemployment  (%)d  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  11.8  14.2  13.6  10.4  11.3  19.6  14.6
Source:  Central  Bank  Bulletin  unless  otherwise  specified.
a.  Source:  Bank staff  estimates.
b.  Consolidated  central  government  deficit  or surplus.
c.  N2 = Ml +  Dp, where  Ml = Money  in circulation  plus drawable  money  of private  sector.  Dp =
Time deposits  at more  than  30 days  of private  sector, excluding  time  savings.
d.  Source:  National  Institute  of Statistics.-5-
borrowing by private banks and businesses was gradually
permitted, with the Government offering no guarantee to foreign
reditors.  Banks were not allowed to take the foreign exchange
risk associated with these funds which instead was passed on to
the final borrowers.
12.  As a result of these measures, the banking sector,
experienced a period of rapid growth and increased efficiency as
did the real sector.  M2 over GDP rose from 9.3 percent in 1974
to a peak of 25.7  percent in 1982 (Table  1; Graph 1).  Spreads
started a steady decline, coming down from an extremely high 46.1
percent in 1974  to their lowest pre-crisis level of 6.8  percent
in 1980  (Table 2; Graph 2).  Lending interest rates followed a
similar trend, experiencing continued declines since 1976,
reaching their lowest pre-crisis level of 12.2 percent a year in
real terms during 1980  (Table  2; Graph 3).  Access to foreign
borrowing brought foreign liabilities,  as a proportion of total
liabilities, from 14.4  percent in 1978  to a peak of 35.8  percent
in 1982  (Table 2;  Graph 4).  Banking institutions also became
more leveraged, with the ratio of total liabilities over capital
and reserves doubling between 1978  and 1983  (Table 2).
13.  In this deregulated environment, competition increased and
new products were offered to savers and investors.  The total
number of banking institutions, including finance companies,
increased by about 50  percent between 1977  and 1981.  Four new
domestic banks and 16 foreign banks were established during this
period.  The market continued to be dominated by private domestic
banks which controlled 67.8  percent of the market by 1983.  The
rest was controlled by the publicly owned bank (18.1 percent),
foreign banks  (12.8 percent) and finance companies (1.3  percent).
Since then, foreign banks have continued to increase their market
participation (Table 3).
2.2  Macroeconomic Problems
14.  By the end of 1981, a six-year expansionary cycle had
abruptly ended.  Domestic and external factors contributed to
acute macroeconomic problems.  In June 1979  the Chilean peso was
fixed in nominal terms to the US dollar in an attempt to bring
domestic inflation down to international levels.  Similarly,
restrictions on foreign borrowing were further eased in an effort
to force high domestic interest rates down to international
levels.  Also, a policy of automatic wage indexation was
established.  As both domestic inflation and interest rates
lagged in adjusting to international levels, the Chilean peso
became strongly overvalued and the large interest rate
differentials made borrowing abroad extremely attractive.  This
situation encouraged an unsustainable boom financed by massive
inflows of foreign credit.  Exports were less competitive and
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Table  2  Selected  bankina.  system  indicators  (1974-83)
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983
Lending  interest  rates  (%)a  15.9  64.2  57.1  42.3  16.9  12.2  38.8  35.1  15.9
Spreads  (%)b  37.6  46.1  30.1  13.6  11.4  6.8  7.9  10.2  11.2
Return  on equity  (%)  N.A.  N.A.  14.6  13.2  14.9  9.1  -2.7  2.8
Foreign  liabilities/total
liabilities  (%)  N.A.  N.A.  14.4  17.1  20.4  28.5  35.8  25.6
Total  liabilities/
capital  & reserves  N.A.  N.A.  8.1  9.3  11.4  11.9  14.2  16.9
Growth  in total  loans  &
investments  (%)C  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  33.8  51.7  16.5  25.2  13.1
Past due  loans/total
loans  (%)  N.A.  N.A.  0.0  1.6  1.2  2.3  4.1  8.4
Risky  loans  sold to the
Central  Bank/total  loans  (%)  - - - - - - 4.1  10.0
Risky  loans  sold +  past due
loans/capital  & reserve  (%)  - - 0.0  10.8  10.5  22.4  78.8  158.1
Source:  Central  Bank Bulletin  and Superintendency  of Banks  (Informacion  Financie'a).
a. Annual  real  interest  rate charged  for short-term  loans  (c-ompounded  monthly).
b. Gross  spread:  Difference  between  short-term  lending and deposit  rates.
c. In real terms  adjusted  by CPI.-8-
Table  3  Structure  of the bankinQ  system  (1984-87)
1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Number  of banks  42  49  49  55  61  50  45  45  45  41  41
Public  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1
Private  domestic  19  18  19  20  21  21  23  24  20  18  18  19  16  15
Foreign  1  1  2  3  6  9  13  19  19  19  19  18  20  21
Finance  companies  NA  NA  NA  18  21  18  18  17  10  7  7  7  4  4
Total  assets  j.  100.0  100.0  100-0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Public  (%)  27.4  22.9  21.2  18.9  16.2  18.1  18.5  21.5  20.8  20.0
Private
domestica  (%)  66.7  71.4  72.5  77.7  82.0  67.8  68.3  64.3  63.2  62.8
Foreign  (%)  12.8  12.2  13.2  15.1  16.3
Finance
companies  (%)  5.9  5.7  6.3  3.4  1.8  1.3  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.9
Source:  Superintendency  of Banks  (Informacion  Financiera).
R.  Includes  Bancos  de Fomento,  IFICOOP  and  foreign  banks  (for 1978-82).-9-
of 1979 and the end of 1981, Chile's private external debt
tripled.  The absorption of large capital inflows created an
unsustainable current account deficit of 18.9 percent of GDP in
1981 (Table  1).
15.  The country was led into a depression due to the loss of
competitiveness in both export and import substitution sectors,
the drop in terms of trade (especially  in copper prices caused by
tne world recession and the rising dollar), the rise in
international and domestic interest rates, and the abrupt cut of
voluntary fLreign credit to Latin America.  In 1982, the
Government was forced to devalue the Chilean peso and real GDP
fell 14.1 percent (Table 1).  Unemployment climbed to a record
19.6 percent in 1982, in part caused by the need of corporations
to adjust to the depression by lowering employment since they
were not permitted to reduce wages in real terms.
2.3  Financial Sector Problem
16.  Difficulties stemming from the macroeconomic situation were
aggravated by a surge of unsound financial practices.  These
practices, especially loose lending practices and loan
concentration in affiliated companies, were mainly the result of:
(i)  the lack of experience of domestic bankers in operating in a
less regulated environment; (ii) the proliferation of highly
leveraged industrial/financial conglomerates; (iii)  weak
supervision and control; and (iv)  the de facto deposit guarantee
for depositors.
17.  After decades of working in a repressed financial
environment where competition was scarce, real interest rates low
or  negative,  and  credit  allocation  largely  determined  by the
Central Bank, most bankers were not prepared in 19.. to operate
in a more liberal environment.  As a result, several risks
associated with the financial business were overlooked.  Credit
standards were inadequate,  with intermediaries looking mainly to
the historical knowledge of their borrowers or to their
collateral, without paying due attention to their repayment
capacity.  Credit standards were further relaxed when  banking
institutions started a fierce struggle for market share in 1978.
Moreover, the opening up of external borrowing led many banking
institutions to lend in foreign currencies to borrowers operating
in the nontradeable sector.  Although banking institutions did
not directly take on the foreign exchange risk--regulations
prohibited this--they did take on credit risk.  When devaluations
of domestic currency took place, the repayment capacity of these
borrowers evaporated and credits turned sour.
18.  Several banks also concentrated their loan portfolio on
affiliated companies that were not creditworthy.  Some bankers
needed to funnel funds to their own businesses in order to pay- 10  -
tor the shares of the banks they had bought from the Government.
The privatization of the banking system after 1973/74 was made to
a private qector which was undercapitalized as a consequence of
the previous Government's economic policies.  For this reason,
several businessmen bought these banks without enough capital to
pay for them and, as a result, turned to the same banks for the
needed money.  Moreover, many bankers attempted to use their
financial institutions to facilitate a rapid expansion of their
related industrial/financial  businesses.  In either case, the
related businesses became extremely leveraged and were the first
to be hard hlt when the macroeconomic situation worsened.  Loan
concentration in affiliated businesses was a widespread practice
as can be seen in Table 4.
19.  Although Chile advanced substantially in liberalizing and
increasing the efficiency of its banking system, it did not
streamline its supervisory capabilities and prudential
regulations at the same pace.  In spite of the liberalization and
increased competition, supervision continued to focus on
reviewing compliance with accounting rules and related
regulations, but did not concentrate on the overall risks
affecting the operations of eech bank.  These risks became
greater in a more competitive and deregulated environment.
Important shortcomings were present in the analysis of loan
portfolios, interest accruals, and provisions to cover potential
loan losses.  Loan diversification was also difficult to control.
As a consequence, the Superintendency of Banks had difficulty in
stopping unsound practices and in providing timely and reliable
public information on the financial condition of each bank.
20.  Although the Government had limited explicit guarantees for
small depositors, depositors in general thought there was a
de facto 100 percent guarantee.  This was explained in part by
the bailout of depositors of an insolvent medium-sized bank--
Banco Osorno--in 1977.  This policy was reiterated in the eight
insolvency cases that arose during 1981.  Working under this
assumption, depositors did not exert a strong pressure on riskier
intermediaries.  They just channeled their resources to those
institutions paying the higher interest rates.
2.4  Magnitude of the Banking Crisis and Options
21.  Macroeconomic problems and unsound financial practices
cGmbined to cause severe solvency and profitability problems in a
large segment of the banking sector.  Non-performing loans--the
sum of past due loans and risky loans sold by banking
institutions to the Central Bank--jumped from 2.3 percent of the
total loan portfolio in 1981, to 8.2 percent in 1982, and further
to 18.4 percent in 1983.  The total volume of non-performing
loans was actually much higher but not fully reflected in the
figures because the large banks that were intervened in early- 11  -
Table  4  Concentration  of credit  to related  parties
As % of  As % of
total  loans  total  loans
Institution  Dec.  1982  Feb.  1983
Banks
De Santiago  42.3  45.8
Nacional  25.7  30.1
Internacional  22.8  25.9
Colocadora  Nacional  de Valores  23.8  24.4
De Chile  18.6  19.7
Hipotecario  de Fomento  Nacional  18.5  18.9
Sud Americano  14.8  16.2
De A. Edwards  14.9  15.4
Credito  e Inversiones  11.9  12.0
Concepcion  12.2  12.0
Del Pacifico  10.0  10.3
O'Higgins  9.1  8.9
Morgan  Finansa  7.0  6.8
osorno  y La Union  5.6  5.9
nd. y de Comercio  Exterior  4.0  5.5
Del Trabajo  1.6  1.9
Finance  Companies
Corfinsa  S.A.  20.8  22.4
Fusa  S.A.  22.5  18.0
De Interes  Social  S.A.  15.4  18.0
LatinoAmericana  De Desarrollo  7.6  7.9
Condell  S.A.  6.8  6.4
Comercial  1.5  1.4
Mediterraneo  S.A.  0.1  0.1
Davens  S.A.  0.2  -
Source:  Superintendency  of Banks  (Informacion  Financiera).- 12 -
1983 were not allowed to sell  risky portfolios to the Central
Bank until 1985/86.  Only in 1986 was the full magnitude of the
problem reflected with non-performing loans representing 35.4
percent of total loans.  If expressed  as a  proportion of the
banking system's total equity, non-performing loans increased
from 22.4 percent in 1981, to 78.8 percent in 1982, and further
to 158.1 percent in 1983.  The peak of non-performing loans as a
proportion of total equity was reached in 1986 then started  to
decline (Graph  5).  similarly, profitability showed  a  steep
decline: return on equity fell from a healthy 14.9 percent in
1980 to a  negative 2.7 percent in 1982, to recuperate afterwards
(Graph  6).
22.  Considering the magnitude of the problems facing the banking
sector, there were two extreme alternatives:  to let insolvent
institutions  go bankrupt--forcing domestic and foreign creditors
as well as shareholders to take the losses--or to bail them out
by absorbing their losses.  In the first case, the Government
would not take any direct losses; in the second case, losses for
the Government would be maximized.
23.  In the end, an intermediate solution was reached where the
Government absorbed an important part of the losses through
different mechanisms to restore the system's profitability--with
cost eharing by shareholders and, to a very limited extent, by
depositors.  The alternative of allowing two thirds of the system
go bankrupt was discarded because of the time it would have taken
to restore confidence and rebuild the system so it would support
the adjustment that was taking place in the real sector of the
economy.  A complete bailout was also discarded because the cost
of the crisis would have been totally absorbed by the Government
and market discipline would have been abandoned.
2.5  The 1981/82 Interventions
24.  During the end of 1981 and 1982, 11 financial institutions
were intervened--their  management taken over--by the Government
and subsequently liquidated.  These institutions represented some
14.5 percent of the system's total loan portfolio (Table  5).  In
all of these cases, depositors were compensated and losses taken
by both shareholders and the Government.  Shareholders lost their
equity investment and the Government absorbed all differences
between the value of assets and liabilities, excepting equity.- 13  -






1981  1982  1983
Total  8  3 
Banks  48  2a  7
Financial  companies  4  is  is
Loans of institutions intervened or
liquidated/total loans (%)  13  1.5  45
a. First intervened and subsequently liquidated.
b. Two banks liquidated; one intervened and subsequently merged;
four intervened and subsequently rehabilitated and
privatized  .- 14  -
25.  In the case of the two largest banks intervened during this
period, the route followed was a more or less traditional one of
transferring during a weekend their most important assets and
liabilities to new purchasing banks of recognized solvency (in
this case two well known foreign  banks operating small branches
in the country).  These institutions  were put into receivership,
with the receiver immediately transferring part of the assets and
liabilities to the acquiring institutions.  Depositors then
suffered no disruption.  In these cases, macroeconomic problems
had little effect.  These two largest insolvent banks had been
experiencing loan portfolio problems before the macroeconomic
crisis.  They both had severe operational problems together with
an excessive loan concentration in highly indebted affiliated
companies  .
2.6  The 1983 Banking  Crisis
26.  By the end of 1982 the magnitude of the macroeconomic crisis
was apparent and the banking system's profitability and solvency
seriously weakened.  Several institutions  were insolvent.  In
January 1983, the Government decided to intervene the insolvent
institutions (seven  banks and one finance company) and
immediately liquidate the three of them experiencing the largest
problems.  In the five remaining cases--which included the
system's two largest private banks--the decision was made to
rehabilitate them under the assumption that the costs of these
rehabilitations would be outweighed by the benefits.  These five
banks were not only affected by the macroeconomic situation but
had also heavily concentrated their loan portfolios in affiliated
c-ompanies. Concentration fluctuated between 12 percent and 45.8
percent of their total loan portfolios.
27.  In the case of the three financial institutions that were
liquidated, the Government offered to purchase the credits of
both domestic and foreign creditors (domestic  deposits or foreign
loans) at 75 percent of their face value.  Domestic depositors
took advantage of this facility and sold their credits at that
discount.  Nevertheless, foreign creditors exerted severe
pressure to get full compensation in several cases conditioning
their foreign trade credit lines and participation in possible
external debt reschedulings to full repayment.  In the end, these
foreign liabilities  were guaranteed by the Government within the
overall restructuring of the external debt.
III.  MECHANISMS USED TO REHABILITATE PROBLEM BANKS
3.1  Background
28.  Four main mechanisms we~re  implemented by the Government in
early 1983 to relieve borrowers, the banking system in general,- 15 -
and to rehabilitate and privatize the institutions intervened by
the Government:  (i)  debt-relief schemes for borrowers, including
prefarential exchange rates for repaying their dollar-denominated
debts, across-the-board debt reschedulings, and dedollarization
of certain debts; (ii) purchase of risky loans by the Central
Bank with a repurchase obligation on the part of banks'
shareholders; (iii) recapitalization and subsequent sale of
intervened banks to snall investors; and (iv) streamlined
supervision and prudential regulations.  Besides these four
mechanisms, an explicit deposit guaranteco  was offered by the
Government to all depositors to restore confidence in the system
while the effects of these mechanisms were taking place.
29.  While the above-mentioned mechanisms represent an effort at
recognizing and allocating losses, the first policy initiatives
aimed chiefly at deferring the problem.  At the end of 1981 and
first part of 1982 the extent of the crisis was still not clear.
Considering the difficulties faced by the banking system as
temporary, several measures were adopted, providing banking
institutions with increased accounting flexibility  to reflect
their losses.  These included:  (i) authorization to banking
institutions to record as past due, loans that had been in
arrears for 90 days instead of 30 days, as was the traditional
practice; (ii) extra time for banking institutions to build up
sufficient provisions to cover potential loan losses;
(iii) establishment of a 5-year period to absorb losses resulting
from the sale of goods and real estate that had been foreclosed;
and (iv) exceptions to the maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 20,
including authorization to banking institutions to account
gradually for the increase in liabilities as a result of the
devaluation of the domestic currency, authorization to consider
as capital up to 25 percent of the provisions for risky loans,
and authorization to absorb annual losses against paid-in capital
in a five-year period.
30.  Although accounting regulations were relaxed, non-performing
loans continued to accumulate and the Central Bank decided to
purchase these non-performing loans from banking institutions.
This mechanism--which was the basis for an expanded program of
purchase of non-performing loans described below--was basically
an accounting procedure to provide banks with extra time to build
up required provisions.  The Central Bank agreed to buy non-
performing loans up to an equivalent of 100 percent of the equity
base of banking institutions.  It paid for these loans with a
promissory note maturing in ten years.  Banking institutions  were
required to repurchase these non-performing loans before the
promissory note became due.  As a result of this operation,
banking institutions did not need to provision against non-
performing loans.  Nevertheless, there was no transfer of real
resources to these banks.- 16 -
31.  During 1984 and 1985--when the positive effects of measures
discussed below were being felt--the accounting flexibilities
above were dismantled.  Banks were required to provision all non-
performing loans still remaining on their balance sheets, to
accelerate the absorption against capital of cumulative losses,
and to dispose of foreclosed items in a shorter period of time.
3.2  Debt Relief Measures
(a)  Preferential Exchange Rate
32.  To reduce the negative impact on foreign currency borrowers
of the substantial devaluation that took place in June 1982--
after almost three years of a fixed exchange rate betweezn  the
Chilean peso and the US dollar--the Central Bank established a
preferential exchange rate for foreign currency denominated
debts.  The preferential exchange rate was to be adjusted by
inflation from the level prevailing in August 1982 so it would
remain constant in real terms.  Accordingly, the amount of the
preference--i.e., subsidy--was equal to the difference between
the higher official exchange rate prevailing at the moment a debt
was to be paid and the level of the preferential exchange rate.
Debtors had to pay their debts to banking institutions  at the
official rate but immediately  qualified for the Central Bank
subsidy.
33.  Although the Central Bank subsidy initially was paid in
cash, it was gradually restricted afterwards, until its final
4limination in February 1987.  At first, the subsidy was paid in
cash which represented a heavy subsidy for borrowers as well as
monetary expansion from the Central Bank.  Subsequently, the
Central Bank began to pay this subsidy with negotiable interest-
bearing bonds.  Since these bonds could be repurchased by the
Central Bank at a discount rate in the secondary market, this
modification reduced the amount of the subsidy.  In June 1985,
when the difference between the official and preferential rate
was about 30 percent, the Central Bank decided to discontinue
this program in an 18-month period.  During this period, the
difference between both rates was reduced at a rate of 1/18th a
month.  Eventually, both rates became unified in February 1987.
34.  The preferential exchange rate program represented a strong
relief to the solvency and profitability of toreign-currency
indebted borrowers.  This was the program that had the largest
cost for the Central Bank.
(b)  The 1983 Across-the-Board Debt Reschedulina
35.  Although the preferential exchange rate program meant an
important relief for borrowers, most of them--especially those
indebted in domestic currency--could not repay their debts at the- 17  -
prevailing high interest rates  (over 30 percent a year in real
terms) and short maturities.  For this reason, in April 1983 the
Central Bank decided to instruct banking institutions to provide
across-the-board debt relief for at least 30 percent of the debt
of their "productive"  borrowers.  Productive borrowers were those
with debts other than consumer loans, mortgage loans, foreign
trade related loans, loans to holding companies and, except for
certain restrictions, loans to related companies.  Loans granted
to borrowers considered financially  unviable were also excluded.
36.  The conditions of these debt reschedulings were very
favorable.  Maturities were extended up to ten years and interest
rates reduced to a maximum of 7 percent a year in real terms.
Repayment of the principal had a grace period of five years,
while interest rates had a grace period of one year.  Borrowers
in foreign currency were also eligible to reschedule their debts
under the same conditions, with the provision that the 7 percent
interest rate was to be calculated over the respective foreign
currency.  Banking institutions received matching rescheduling
funds from the Central Bank as compensation.  The difference
between the existing interest rates on the banking institutions'
loan portfolios and the Central Bank mandatory 7 percent was to
be covered by the latter.  Accordingly, banks did not suffer
liquidity problems or losses arising from the reduced rates.
37.  The first across-the-board debt relief scheme had an
important impact on the cash flow position of rescheduled
borrowers.  Because of the grace period for both the principal
and the interest rate, borrowers could continue operating at
least for one year as if they had no debt at all.
(c)The 1984 Across-the-Board Debt Rescheduling
38.  In June 1984, the 1983 debt relief scheme was expanded.  The
proportion of debt that could be rescheduled  was increased and
terms further eased.  Interest rates were lowered to 5 percent
for the first two years, 6 percent for years three, four, and
five, and 7 percent from the sixth year onwards.  Maturities
could not be less than 5 years or more than 15 years (10  years
for large companies).  For large borrowers, there were other
restrictions, including limitations on the use of operating
profits.  Debts already rescheduled in 1983 could also be
rescheduled under the expanded scheme.
(d)Rescheduling of Mortgage and Consumer Loans
39.  In 1983 the Central Bank also instructed banking
institutions to refinance their mortgage and consumer loans.
Again, the Central Bank provided matching funds to banking
institutions so their liquidity and profitability were not
affected.  In the case of mortgage loans, the amounts to be- 18  -
rescheduled included unpaid installments since 1981.  Borrowers
were also allowed to reduce their installments for the period
1983-87.  Borrowers were required to repay the rescheduled
amounts after the end of their original mortgages, at an annual
real interest rate of 8 percent.  In 1984, this program was also
expanded and interest rates lowered to 6 percent a year  (4
percent for smaller mortgages).  In the case of consumer loans, a
similar but more limited system was established, excluding fixed
interest rate loans.
(e)Dedollarization  of Debts
40.  In September 1984, small- and medium-sized borrowers in
foreign currency were offered the opportunity to prepay their
debts with a new credit in domestic currency.  The exchange rate
used was the preferential exchange rate and the terms were
similar to those used in the June 1984 across-the-board
rescheduling.  Accordingly, small- and medium-sized borrowers
were released from the exchange rate risk.  The cost of this
program was also absorbed by the Central Bank.
41.  Size of the Debt Relief Measures.  According to the
Superintendency of Banks' estimates, the amount of loans that
were rescheduled and their previously described mechanisms
represented about 25 percent of the banking system's total loan
portfolio.
3.3  Purchase of Risky Loans by the Central Bank
42.  Non-intervened banks, although helped by the relaxation of
accounting regulations and by the positive effects of debt relief
schemes, still faced acute problems.  Risky loans were placing
several of these banks Lt the edge of bankruptcy while spreads
and lending rates continued to increase.  The banking system was
not recovering at the required pace to support the restructuring
of the real sector of the economy.  Further help was needed.
43.  In February 1984, the Central Bank decided to act directly
on this problem and offered to purchase risky loans from
financial institutions up to 150 percent of their equity capital
as of November 1983.  This percentage was subsequently expanded
to 250 percent in the case of those banks that were required to
increase their capital.  Banks had to use the cash resulting from
these sales to the Central Bank to either repay emergency loans
previously granted by the Central Bank or to buy Central Bank
promissory notes.  These promissory notes bore a 7 percent annual
interest rate in real terms and were redeemable over 16 quarters.
The reduction or elimination of risky loans in the assets of
these institutions restored their solvency and profitability at
once.  Moreover, the fact that the cash received by the- 19  -
institutions  had to be used to repay emergency loans or to buy
Central Bank promissory notes neutralized  monetary expansion.
44.  Shareholders were bound to repurchase the risky loans from
the Central Bank out of their profits.  In this respect, it is
important to highlight that these were shareholders' and not
banks' liabilities.  Shareholders were not allowed to receive any
dividend from their investments  until the purchase obligation was
finished.  The amount of risky loans to be repurchased was
adjusted according to inflation plus a 5 percent surcharge.  For
this reason, this mechanism can also be considered as a credit
from the Central Bank to shareholders to recapitalize their
banking institutions, with an interest rate of 5 percent a year
in real terms.  Capital increases  were exempted from the
repurchase obligation and dividends could be received in
propc-tion to the capital increase.
45.  The administration of the purchased loan portfolio remained
in each bank, which received a mandate from the Central Bank to
administer and collect it.  All collections had to be allocated
to repurchase risky loans.  Borrowers were not informed of the
fact that their debts had been sold to the Central Bank.  These
arrangements made it unnecessary for the Central Bank to set up a
special facility to administer the purchased loans.  Moreover,
borrowers could not take advantage of the fact that their credit
was not with a private bank any more.
46.  The purchase of risky loans by the Central Bank brought
about a substantial improvement in the solvency and profitability
of non-intervened banking institutions, since non-performing
assets were heavily reduced or eliminated from their balance
sheets.  Confidence by depositors was also increased in the face
of sounder institutions.  Pressures over spreads and interest
rates started to recede.  According to the Superintendency of
Banks' estimates, this mechanism lowered the proportion of risky
loans to equity from 155 percent to 50 percent in the case of
those banks that made use of it.
3.4  RecaRitalization of Intervened Banks ("Capitalismo Popular")
47.  Considering that proportionately higher losses affecting
these banks and their uncertain future because of the
intervention, the Central Bank did not agree to purchase risky
loans from these banks until their financial condition was
improved.  The sale of risky loans to the Central Bank alone
would not have been sufficient to return these banks to solvency.
Therefore, a further capital injection was necessary.  For this
purpose, in early 1985 a law was enacted authorizing the
Superintendency of Banks to require from banking institutions
under intervention the necessary capital increases to make them
financially  viable.- 20  -
48.  To force the recapitalization of these intervened banks, the
law established that the required capital increases should first
be offered to existing shareholders for a short period of time
and then to the public in general.  Any stock not purchased by
existing shareholders or the public could be purchased by the
Government, which would pay by converting Central Bank emergency
loans into equity.  These stocks would be disposed of by the
Government over a period not to exceed five years and at the rate
of no less than 20 percent per year.  Purchase of stock by the
Government could not exceed 49 percent of the intervened bank's
capital at any moment, so it could never control it.  If the need
for recapitalization was higher, the Government had first to sell
part of its stock.  Once the capital increase required by the
Superintendency of Banks had been paid in, each intervened
banking institution was entitled to sell risky loans to the
Central Bank under the same mechanism applied to the banks not
under intervention.  As in the previous case, new shareholders
were not bound by the repurchase obligation.
49.  The Government offered ample credit facilities and subsidies
to small investors to encourage them to purchase the stock of
intervened banks.  Investors had to pay only 5 percent as
downpayment and the rest in a period not to exceed 15 years.  The
interest rate was zero in real terms and there was also a 30
percent discount on the principal for prompt payment.  Dividends
were tax-free.  Moreover, investors could cancel these credits at
any time by turning in their shares to the Government.  A limit
was set on these sales to ensure wide ownership ("capitalismo
popular").
50.  This procedure was used in the case of the two largest
intervened banks (Banco  de Chile and Banco de Santiago).  Two
other banks (Banco  Concepci6n and Banco Internacional) were sold
to other domestic investors and the smallest one (Banco
Colocadora Nacional de Valores) was absorbed by Banco de
Santiago.  Between 1985 and 1987, the recapitalization and sale
of the stock of these institutions  was basically completed.  At
present, all these banks are under private administration with
Banco de Chile and Banco de Santiago having about 39,000 and
16,000 shareholders, respectively.
3.5  Supervision and Prudential Regulations
51.  Together with the above-mentioned mechanisms to restore
solvency to problem banks, there was a complete shift in the
focus of supervision towards credit risk analysis and assessment
of the overall financial condition of each bank.  Special
attention was given to:  (i) loan portfolio classification
according to risk of default and loan provisioning; (ii) early
warning systems; and (iii) information  disclosure.- 21 -
52.  Early in 1980, a comprehensive program of loan portfolio
classification according to risk of default was established.  It
was recognized that the most important risk to the solvency of a
banking institution came from the loan portfolio, and that a
sound assessment of the solvency and profitability of a bank
could not be made without having a clear idea of the quality of
its loan portfolio.  Accordingly, banks were required to classify
their loan portfolios in one of four categories according to the
risk of default.  The risk of default was to be determined
considering three elements:  (i)  repayment capacity of the
borrower; (ii) knowledge of the borrower and its previous
creditworthiness record; and (iii)  pledged collateral.  To
discourage unsound lending and to cover potential loan losses,
banks were required to provision those loans that received a low
classification.  This represented a complete departure from the
traditional principle that only past due loans should be
provisioned.
53.  A better knowledge of the quality of the loan portfolio was
instrumental in the design of the different mechanisms to
reschedule debts and recapitalize banks.  It provided the
necessary information to estimate the size of existing losses, to
design the corrective action that was needed, and to assess the
expected cost for the Government.
54.  In 1982, when the system of the loan portfolio
classification was well advanced in its implementation, an early
warning system was also established.  The system was based on
financial ratio analysis and permitted to assess the current and
projected financial condition of each bank.  According to these
assessments, banks were grouped in different risk categories.
The variables considered to make this classification were
adequacy of the capital, quality of the asset,.,  quality of the
management, profitability, and liquidity.  Tht}  system was derived
from the CAMEL system, the acronym for Capital, Assets,
Management, Earnings, and Liquidity, used by t.s US regulatory
agencies since the late 1970s.
55.  Information disclosure was also considered a key element in
a more deregulated banking system.  With timely and reliable
information depositors could better discriminate among different
institutions and exert market discipline.  Accordingly, the
Superintendency of Banks gradually increased the disclosure of
information, including detailed monthly balance sheets and income
statements, and information on loan-portfolio concentration.
Moreover, in 1983, the CAMEL indicators started to be published
to facilitate the analysis of specific institutions and
comparisons with the rest of the system.
56.  A new banking law was passed in 1986 strengthening the
monitoring and enforcement powers of the Superintendency of- 22 -
Banks.  Of particular importance was the new responsibility of
the Superintendency to induce the recapitalization of a bank when
its capital base is deteriorating.  It establishes certain
limits to a bank's capacity to accept demand deposits in an
attempt to improve the stability of the system and reduce the
risk of bank runs in case of bankruptcies.  The law also improves
the regulations on information  disclosure and lending to related
companies, and widens the business of banking institutions by
allowing them to engage in the securities business through
subsidiaries.
V.  RESULTS
57.  Considering the steady macroeconomic and financial sector
improvements from 1984 to 1988, it can be argued that the way the
Chilean banking crisis was handled was successful.  Nevertheless,
financial costs were not negligible.  The definite financial
costs are difficult to estimate because they were spread over
several years.  Then, depending on the fluctuations of the
exchange rate or interest rates in the future, these costs can be
further increased or reduced.  For example, the mechaniisms  used
to solve the crisis resulted in the Central Bank's having high
foreign exchange exposure in return for domestic-denominated
assets.  If the domestic currency were to appreciate, losses
would be reduced.  Similarly, the fall in interest rates has
reduced losses and has caused many borrowers to prepay
rescheduled loans.  Moreover, these financial costs have to be
compared with the benefits associated with a more stable and
strongly performing economy, further complicating any evaluation.
58.  According to World Bank estimates the largest financial loss
comes from the preferential dollar program, followed by the
purchase of a risky loan portfolio, and debt reschedulings.
Subsidies associated with "capitalismo  popular" are smaller.
These estimates are very sensitive to the proportion of risky
loans sold to the Central Bank which will be repurchased (the
previous estimation assumes that 70 percent of risky loans will
be repurchased and that it will be necessary to write off only 30
percent).
59.  The macroeconomic situation has steadily improved since
1984.  GDP grew at an average rate of 5 percent a year between
1984  and 1987.  The estimated growth for 1988  is about 7.4
percent.  The current account deficit nas been brought down from
10.7  percent of GDP  in 1984,  to 4.3 percent of GDP in 1987,  and
to an expected 1.2 percent of GDP in 1988.  The fiscal situation
is under control and the fiscal budget will experience a small
surplus during 1988.  Unemployment has also come down and should
be about 8 percent in 1988.  The economy continues to remonetize
and inflation is estimated at 12 percent in 1988,  about half of
its 1984  level.  The 1988  performance has been positively- 23 -
affected by an important improvement in the terms of trade which
have been influenced by the strong recovery in the price of
copper  (Table  6).
60.  The structural change in the Chilean economy since the
beginning of the crisis can also be observed by looking at the
composition of the GDP.  While the estimated GDP for 1988 is
expected to be around 10 percent above the 1981 GDP, nontradeable
sectors like construction and commerce are only 3 percent and 4.4
percent above the 1981 levels, respectively.  Tradeable sectors
show a much better performance with agriculture and forestry 20
percent above their 1981 level, mining 16 percent above, and
industry 10.5 percent above.
61.  The banking system showed very strong performance between
1984 and 1987 as well.  Lending interest rates declined to almost
50 percent below their 1983 levels.  Spreads show a similar
trend.  Profitability increased from 2.8 percent of return on
equity in 1983 to 13.7 percent in 1987.  Capital adequacy
continues to improve and risky loans sold to the Central Bank
plus past due loans are also decreasing (Table  7).  The banking
system is also increasingly  taking advantage of the possibility
of operating in the securities business.  Several banks have
already established mutual funds, leasing companies, brokerage
facilities, and related business.  Possibly the most important
remaining challenge for several banks will be their obligations
to repurchase the risky portfolios sold to the Central Bank.
62.  In conclusion, it can be argued that the way the banking
crisis was handled in Chile has permitted a rapid recovery of the
banking system which has been supporting the oveiall recovery of
the economy.  The fact that there was the political decision to
recognize the problem at an early stage and to absorb and
allocate losses through comprehensive programs was instrumental
in the success of the solution of the crisis.  Although banking
systems will never be isolated from the negative effects of
macroeconomic crises, it is clear that a more competitive and
deregulated banking industry, together with better supervision
and prudential regulation, increased the resiliency of the system
to face such problems.- 24  -
Table 6  Selected macroeconomic indicators (1983-87)
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Real GDP growth rate (%)  -0.7  6.3  2.4  5.7  5.7
Real effective exchange
rate  (1980 =  10O)a  117.5  119.2  150.4  173.0  178.4
Terms of trade (1980  =100  85.8  80.6  76.0  75.5  81.3
Cturrent  account/GDP (%)  -7.1  -10.7  -8.3  -6.5  -4.3
Fiscal deficit (-)
or surplus/GDPb  -2.6  -3.0  -2.4  -1.0  -0.8
M2/GDP  (%)c  19.3  20.7  20.1  19.8  22.9
Infltion (CPI) (3,  23.1  23.0  26.4  17.4  19.9
Unemployment (%)  14.6  13.9  12.0  8.8  9.6
Source:  Central Bank Bulletin unless otherwise specified.
a.  Source:  Bank staff estimates.
b. Consolidated central government deficit or surplus.
c. M2 =  Ml +  Dp, where Ml =  Money in circulation plus drawable
money of private sector.  Dp =  Time deposits at more than 30
days of private sector, excluding time savings.
d. Source:  National Institute of Statistics.  For 1985-87, last
quarter  (October-December)  numbers  have  been  used.- 25 -
Tbkle  7  S1Qected_banking  system  indicators  (1983-87)
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Lending  interest  rates  (%)a  15.9  11.3  11.0  7.6  7.7
Spreads  (%)b  11.2  8.6  6.6  6.0  5.9
Return  on  equity  (%)C  2.8  6.9  7.4  7.2  13.7
Foreign  liabilities/total
liabilities  (%)  25.6  23.4  21.2  19.9  17.0
Total  liabilities/capital
& Reserves  16.9  23.4  23.7  20.8  17.5
Growth  in loans  &
investments  (%)d  13.1  19.1  25.8  -1.8  -3.7
Past due  loans/total  loans  (%)  8.4  8.9  3.5  3.8  2.7
Risky  loans  sold to Central
Bank/total  loans  10.0  10.7  26.5  31.6  30.6
Risky  loans  sold +  past  due
loans/capital  & reserves  (%)158.1  186.3  231.2 240.6  215.6
Source:  Central  Bank  Bulletin  and Superintendency  of Banks
(Informacion  Financiera).
a.  Real  interest  rate  charged  for short-term  loans  (compounded
monthly).
b. Gross  spread:  Difference  between  short-term  lending  and
deposit  rates.
c. Net profit  figures  for 1984-87  include  the  income  used  to
repurchase  the  risky  portfolio  sold  to the Central  Bank.
d. In real terms,  adjusted  using  CPI.PPR  Working  Paper  Series
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